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AGRICULTURE IN LYDENBURG, 1900-1960
Historians opposed to structural analysis and working with models that place a
greater emphasis on human agency have argued that white fanners were always
highly stratified. For the period before 1930, a number of studies demonstrated
that this was indeed the case, but very little detailed analysis emerged to show
that stratification continued after 1930, into the 1990s.1 Instead, despite some
statistical analyses showing that 20 per cent of white farmers produced 70 per
cent of output throughout the 1950s, the literature is still dominated by assertions
that 'white farming* became 'capitalist1 or 'experienced an agricultural revolution*
sometime between 1930 and I960.2 These approaches are unsatisfactory, because
they ignore the majority of white farmers who made only small contributions to
agriculture's GDP. Although many of these farmers experienced structural
transformations, they did not become 'capitalist farmers*, nor did they fully
participate in an 'agricultural revolution*. These farmers remained dependent on
state aid and cheap labour, and their inability to become independent profit
maximisers has had important consequences for South Africa's current
transformation. It has provided the economic context for many farmers* right-wing
allegiances.
This paper attempts to make a contribution towards a more stratified picture of
white farming. It focuses on the district of Lydenburg, where most whites today
appear to support the notion of a *boere-staat\ The paper argues that districts like
Lydenburg must be differentiated from more productive districts elsewhere in the
Transvaal. Further, farmers within Lydenburg were also stratified, which meant
that changes in the district always had an uneven impact. From this perspective
rural transformations were not homogenous phenomena imposed from above.
Every change was contested at a number of levels: by white farmers threatened
by the growing dominance of the market, and by Africans seeking to maintain
access to land.
The paper focuses on how economic processes transformed Lydenburg. From 1902
the district was gradually integrated more fully into the wider South African
economy, and experienced spurts of growth that raised most farmers' standard of
living. However, the paper shows that farmers did not benefit equally from this
growth. Some farmers were always more ready to take risks, and thus benefited
the most, while others remained cautious, failed to expand their enterprises, and
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struggled to retain their land. A growing number of these farmers eventually gave
up this struggle and moved to the urban areas. The paper also demonstrates that
both economic accumulation and attempts to retain land in the face of hostile
market forces were dependent on various forms of state aid.
Before examining the processes of economic growth and stratification in
Lydenburg, we must first place the district in a wider context. During the
nineteenth century, Lydenburg was described as an 'economic backwater*. In the
course of the following century the district became more dynamic, but, in relation
to other regions, it remained backward. Little comparative analysis has been done
on Transvaal districts, but available statistics describing the value produced by
different categories of farmers in each agricultural district allow us to make some
comparative assessments for 1962; at the end of the period of discussion. At that
time Lydenburg*s average output per farmer placed the district in forty fifth place
out of a total of fifty five agricultural districts. Lydenburg*s average was less than
a quarter of the average achieved in lowveld districts like Barberton and
Nelspruit, and western Transvaal districts like Lichtenburg and Schweizer
Reineke.3
Lydenburg*s first disadvantage was its distance away from any significant urban
centre. The distance between Lydenburg and Johannesburg is, for example, 334
kilometres. Secondly, the soils in Lydenburg are not as fertile as those in the
western Transvaal maize belt and the eastern Transvaal lowveld. The latter,
neighbouring, area has the additional advantage of a tropical climate that favours
fruit and citrus production. Some oranges were grown in the lower lying valleys
of Lydenburg, where quasi-lowveld conditions prevailed, but frost often destroyed
these crops.4
Although the district was backward, it was not unimportant. It was a major wheat
producing area in the Transvaal, and one of its leading farmers, A. Op t' Hof,
played an central role in the establishment of a wheat board in the 1930s.6
Further, the sheep raised in the district were of a high quality, although their
number was relatively small. Most importantly the farmers of the district can be
regarded as representative of poorer, less-capitalised Transvaal farmers, who
depended on labour tenants until the 1970s, and who played a crucial political role
in the 1948 election. These farmers constantly pressurised the state for further
protection from market forces, and thus had an important influence on the
economy.
1900-1930
Agriculture in the district was in bad shape at the turn of the century. The
outbreak of the Anglo-Boer war had disrupted trade routes - which affected both
farmers and transport riders - and had eliminated the payment of mineral options.
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The latter was a crucial source of revenue for the landowners of Lydenburg,
especially as many sold 'keep alive options' that required the buyers to pay an
annual fee to keep the option alive.6 Thus the outbreak of the war cut Lydenburg
off from markets and cash. As the war dragged on, invested capital was destroyed
when the fighting, including attacks on farms by Africans, led to the destruction
of homesteads and agricultural equipment.7
In 1902 the Standard Bank only had two 'noteworthy debtors': Abel Erasmus Snr.
and Jnr. The former made his fortune before the war, by extorting 'taxes' from
Africans, and investing some capital in agriculture.8 The rest of the white
farmers, who only had their land, and whose capital savings had not been large
enough to survive the war, basically had to start over. They were assisted in this
endeavour by state funded 'Repatriation Boards' that compensated larger fanners
for their losses and 'alleviated some of the distress among the poorer class of
farmer'.9
State assistance reduced some of the hardship, but the regional economy in the
early 1910s remained depressed as Lydenburg waited for a viable transport link
to the urban markets of Johannesburg and Pretoria.10 Because of the remoteness
of markets there was a consistent tendency towards overproduction (except during
those periods when locusts destroyed the crops) and the most profitable activities
were transport riding and trading.11 The former activity was threatened by the
outbreak of 'rhodesian redwater' amongst cattle in 1904; which limited
transporting to those who owned donkeys. The latter activity was made difficult
by the large number of traders, which meant that only those who had been in the
district for a long time, and had access to kin and friendship networks, could be
assured of a steady supply of produce. Debt also tied farmers to traders and gave
the individual trader the ability to force farmers to trade with him.12
In 1909 the railway reached Lydenburg from the Pretoria-Belfast line, but,
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according to the Standard Bank inspector, this had little effect on production in
the district.13 In that year the inspector filed the following report:
'From a farming point of view the Lydenburg district cannot be generally classed
as good. The products consist chiefly of wool, maize and wheat, but the quantities
turned out are not heavy. Sheep only do well in certain parts, and the area of
arable land is not large.'14
Despite this pessimistic view, the levels of agricultural activity did increase in the
ten years after the railway came.16 The district had the slight advantage of being
less prone to droughts because it was largely a middle-veld area, which received
rain even when the lowveld and highveld received none.16 Consequently the
district was hardly affected by the drought of 1914, which allowed the farmers to
benefit fully from the expanding markets and higher prices produced by the First
World War.17 Many farmers, having escaped the ravages of drought, were able
to use the extra cash generated by the bigger profits of 1915 and 1916 to pay off
their debts with the Land Bank, and local traders like R.J. Schurink.18 These
tendencies continued into 1919, although an outbreak of rust in the wheat crop of
1917, and the influenza epidemic of 1919 - which prevented the effective
harvesting of the 1918 wheat crop and the sowing of the 1919 maize crop -
hampered agriculture somewhat.19
The depression that began in 1920 put an end to the expansion of production and
the availability of capital. The evidence indicates a number of foreclosures,
although there is no specificity on the precise numbers.20 There was a leniency
on the part of the Standard Bank, who felt that they would recoup their debts
after conditions returned to normal.21 Nevertheless, the population statistics
show that a number of people left Lydenburg during this time, and other evidence
indicates a high level of indigence in the district.22 Prices improved in 1924, but
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in 1925, soon after an outbreak of east coast fever amongst cattle, the district's
luck vis d vis droughts ran out.23 This time they were hit with a serious drought
that lasted until 1928. After eight years of unfavourable circumstances it is not
surprising that in 1928 there were farmers like C.J. Smit and J.P. Nel, who were
creditors that the Standard Bank regarded as extremely undesirable. Smit had
lost all his capital, and was permitted to occupy, on a share-cropping basis, the
farm he once owned. Nel was on the verge of bankruptcy.24
A visiting agricultural officer's report reveals that in some parts of the district the
farming community had been thrown onto the defensive. Many farmers had given
up all hope of "improving their farms', and concentrated instead on survival. The
report on farmers in the Krugerspost area states:
'I visited ... Mr Van Der Merwe who is chairman of the [agricultural] society. His
is a tale of woe: the society is dead or nearly so and he is in despair, for he says he
can not get the members to wake up. They are, he affirms, retrogressing fast, and
he has asked for a special visit from me, to see if we can not get them to wake up
and take a new interest in their farming - owing to drought - bad markets etc. etc.
- the farmers have become low-spirited. Their farming is going the same way as at
Ohrigstad and something must be done to instill new life and methods.*25
The Ohrigstad Settlement Scheme, established in 1912, bordered on the
Krugerspost area, and here poverty was even more endemic. The scheme
contained 68 settlers whose plots differed in size from six to twenty morgen.26
Some of the settlers were able to place all twenty morgen under irrigation,
planting wheat in winter and maize in summer, but this practice quickly
exhausted the soil. All the settlers struggled to keep their heads above water, and
half of them faced losing of their plots in 1927.27
In other parts of Lydenburg conditions were slightly better. In the southern part
of the district farmers were producing a high grade of wool, which fetched up to
27d per pound on the market. The average price for wool in 1928 was 16 to lSd.28
Those farmers who irrigated their fields and grew wheat in winter produced 32000
bags in 1927, and some enterprising farmers diversified into barley, producing
12000 bags, which they sold to the breweries.29
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Many farmers continued to generate cash with their land, a policy that had its
roots in such nineteenth century practices as selling mineral rights. During good
years farmers often invested in land rather than in improvements1 like dams and
fences. They then leased this land out, or acquired mortgages from the Land Bank
and other Banks. Some farmers were actually highly skilled at this practice:
'they go around to all the banks to "raise the wind", and the balance sheets they
furnish cannot be relied upon. Liabilities to other banks and merchants are not
disclosed, the value of farms inflated, and, in several known cases, farmers have
fraudulently misrepresented that farms, being purchased by instalments through
the Land Board, were actually their freehold property*.30
This risky practice suggests that farmers were prepared to gamble with land
ownership, but it does not necessarily mean that they were unconcerned about
maintaining a rural lifestyle. Grosskopf s study, based on interviews conducted
with Transvaal farmers during 1930, showed that land ownership was often
regarded as unimportant and optional while the possibilities of tenant and share-
cropping arrangements were abundant.31 As Grosskopf noted farmers were
becoming less inclined to rent their land to bywoners, but in Lydenburg the
practice was still widespread in 1938. Bywoners in the district were sometimes
given as little as six morgen irrigated land and twelve morgen dry land - for which
they had to pay with one third of their produce - while others received as much
as 80 morgen irrigated land, and 100 morgen dry land. During the period 1935-
1939, 149 bywoners in Lydenburg registered for the state's Tenant Assistance
Scheme.32 Many were poor, but determined to make a living on the land. As one
tenant put it: 'I opened my eyes in agriculture, and I will shut them in
agriculture'.33
Land was still abundant in the Lydenburg district as a whole. For example, in
1929, 651 farmers reported to the Department of Agriculture; they occupied farms
that in total consisted of 403536 morgen. Only 21398 morgen of this land was
'under agricultural crops'.34 Lydenburg was a mountainous district, which
restricted the amount of arable land, and the best land was limited to the soil
riparian to the rivers that ran through the valleys. The figures cited above
nevertheless suggest that large amounts of arable land remained unused, and this
land was therefore still available for bywoners.
Evidence about Lydenburg*s relatively remote Steelpoort Valley indicates that by
1929 more land than before was occupied by white farmers. Nevertheless, land
was not yet scarce, and large tracts were either unoccupied or occupied by
Africans. In 1917, the Steelpoort Valley was beginning to be occupied by whites,
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who had previously used it as winter grazing land for their cattle and sheep.36
In 1922, The Minister of Lands, Deneys Reitz, travelled through the Steelpoort
Valley, and submitted the following report:
The farms lying riparian to the Steelpoort River are, with one exception, privately
owned [by whites], and they are all under beneficial occupation at the present
moment. In travelling down along the river I was greatly struck by the tremendous
development that has gone on there during recent years, and by the large tracts
that have been placed under irrigation.*36
We can, however, assume that Reitz, whose department was sensitive to white
land claims, exaggerated the extent of white occupation and cultivation in the
area.37 A report submitted by the Standard Bank inspector in 1929 presents a
very different picture of the valley. The inspector claimed that, 'the potentialities
of the Steelpoort Valley are well spoken of, but this area remains practically
uncultivated.*38 It appears that the extent of white control had been extended
during the 1920s, but it is highly unlikely that all 2800 morgen of estimated
irrigable land was being put under the plough by white farmers.39
By 1929, when stock markets were crashing in other parts of the world,
Lydenburg's economy had progressed very slowly and with great difficulty. In fact,
farming in the district was finally finding its feet in 1930, when the effects of the
depression began to manifest themselves on the produce markets. In August of
that year the following detailed report was submitted on the various farming
activities in Lydenburg:
'Sheep: On the highveld wooled sheep do very well, and the wool is of good quality.
There are approximately 72000 wooled sheep and 17000 non-wooled sheep in the
district, the latter mostly belong to Natives.
Cattle: This industry is sadly neglected, the cattle in the area being mostly "scrub";
and with the local type of farmer little improvement of the breed can be expected.
The average farmer does not appear to consider it necessary to grow winter feed
for his cattle. Consequently, at this time of year they are in miserably poor
condition. There are 88965 head in the district, of which 63864 belong to Natives.
Wheat: This is the principal grain crop in the district, and is all grown under
irrigation. Last season's crop was poor, owing to rust and hail. About 25000 bags
were reaped as compared with 32000 for the previous season. This season's crop
looks good, and it is estimated that approximately 40000 bags will be reaped.
Maize: This crop is not grown to any extent in the district. Last season's crop was
approximately 40000 bags, and the crop just reaped is slightly in excess of that
figure.
Barley: The demand by the breweries for this crop has fallen off, consequently the
35See Chapter One of thesis.
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farmers have sown less this year. It is estimated that the total production will
approximate 4000 bags, which is just half of the previous crop.*40
Almost on the same day that this report was filed, the Native Economic
Commission (NEC) visited the Lydenburg district and heard the evidence of some
local farmers. Read in isolation, the evidence given by these farmers seems to
indicate that major economic advances had taken place in the district.41 This
contradiction of the description presented above arises because the NEC spoke to
Lydenburg's leading farmers: Elias De Souza was the chairman of the oldest and
strongest farmers union, Hendrik Neethling was the chairman of the farmers
organisation in the Steelpoort Valley, and Marthinus Van Rensburg had recently
achieved a record yield of over 60 bags per morgen.42 The descriptions offered by
these farmers suggests that they always sought to expand their production, no
matter how adverse the conditions.43 It will be shown below, however, that this
attitude was the exception rather than the rule in Lydenburg.
1930-1939
The assertions about the expansion of agriculture in Lydenburg made by farmers
to the NEC at the beginning of 1930 were also based on the forthcoming crop,
which represented a significant jump in productivity. Farmers thus first responded
to the lower prices of the depression by increasing their output. But during the
following two years their spirits were clearly broken, as production dropped once
again to near the 1929 levels.44
The farmers of Lydenburg did not, however, suffer equally during the depression.
Their fortunes varied according to their resources, and according to the kinds of
crops they produced.46 For example, 1931 and 32 were bad years for the district
as a whole, but wool farmers fared particularly badly because their's was primarily
an export crop. Wool prices firstly fell because of the depression, and were then
reduced further by the 'gold standard crisis'.46 Maize and Wheat prices, on the
other hand, were already protected and prices therefore did not hit the same lows
as wool.47
The overall situation in Lydenburg during 1931 was said to be 'somewhat
40
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depressed', and a survey by the Department of Inland Revenue indicated that
conditions were getting worse rather than better in 1932:
The district has been badly hit by the closing down of several mines in the district,
while the one large asbestos mine has reduced its establishment considerably. The
wheat crop at present is very promising, but on the whole the prospects in the
district are not too bright. A shortfall in revenue [must be expected].*48
Despite the railway, many wheat and maize farmers had continued to produce for
local mines and the closures thus represented an additional headache for residents
already affected by lower prices.49 During this time many wool farmers
slaughtered their sheep rather than trying to sell the wool. Only 2000 bales of
wool were produced during 1930 and the number of sheep was declining rapidly
in 1932 as farmers were living on their sheep*.60
In 1933 maize and wheat production once again increased, but prices were still
dropping in early 1933 when they went from 20/ to 18/.51 Nevertheless this
expansion at a time when crops in other districts were wiped out by drought
shows that Lydenburg managed to escape the worst effects of the devastating
1932/33 drought.62 Consequently, the district was once again able to benefit fully
from the generally improved conditions that began in 1934.
The factor behind the subsequent expansion of agriculture in Lydenburg appears
to be an improvement in price controls. The foundations of this process were laid
in 1932 with the establishment of the Wheat Board. Wilson points out that 'the
introduction of a quantitative wheat import control combined with the power to
fix the price of imported wheat well above the international level forced up the
price of the local product and led to a massive extension of wheat farming and a
progressive reduction of wheat imports'. In the Transvaal the area under wheat
increased by 8.7 per cent before 1935.53 Wilson also claims that Maize subsidies
in the 1930s led to an expansion of production.64 Jones and Miiller show,
however, that these increases were not sustained after 1935. They argue that *in
volume terms there was little increase in wheat and maize production between the
mid-1930s and the mid-1940s, though there were considerable annual
fluctuations'.66 The new price controls therefore only provided an initial boost,
which was probably helped along by 1933's devaluation and the subsequent
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'natural' rise in agricultural prices. After 1935 the controls, which were solidified
by the Marketing Act of 1937, had only a limited effect, and mainly served as a
guarantee against the collapse of any agricultural markets. On the other hand, the
stabilised prices made investment in agriculture a much safer option. One would
expect 'progressive farmers' to take greater advantage of this situation, and
economic differentiation in a district like Lydenburg should therefore increase
during the 1930s.
Census figures for Lydenburg generally agree with the composite national picture
outlined above.66 The figures reflect a significant jump in wheat production
during the period 1934 to 1936, and a healthy stabilisation after that period. The
price of wheat went up fairly dramatically up to 1936, but then steadied somewhat
after the wheat surplus of that year.67 Maize production, after the significant
jump in 1933, fluctuated fairly widely, because it was grown on dry-land plots, and
was thus more susceptible to variable rainfall. During the 1930s Lydenburg was
primarily a wheat growing area, and Maize was, on the whole, a secondary crop,
which contributed further to the fluctuations in Maize production. The price of
maize during this period increased as a result of the 1931 Mealie Control Act, but
did not spiral to the same extent as the wheat price.58
The fortunes of Lydenburg*s wool farmers also improved as wool prices made a
dramatic recovery after the depression. The 1935/36 season opened in September
1935 with prices 15 per cent higher than the closing prices of the previous season.
The price increase came about because of greater demand in some European
countries and the renewal of the Union-German agreement.69 Furthermore, the
establishment of the Wool Marketing Committee stabilised wool prices and thus
gave wool farmers security and an incentive to increase production. In 1935/36
48786 sheep in Lydenburg produced 275134 pounds of wool, which was still of a
very good quality and again sold at some of the highest prices on the market.60
The number of sheep in the district increased steadily as a result of these
factors.61
Cattle were kept only to maintain the oxen used for ploughing, and, to a lesser
extent, for milk consumed on the farm.62 Very little time or capital was spent on
'improving cattle* for meat or dairy production, mainly because the lower lying
56
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areas of Lydenburg were very prone to cattle diseases.63 In 1938 it was reported
that some fanners were improving their herds, but they were mainly from the
higher, southern portions of Lydenburg.64
The 1930s were clearly a period of significant agricultural development in the
district of Lydenburg, which is borne out further by the increase in the land placed
under cultivation from 21398 morgen, of which 11450 was irrigated in 1930, to
25576 morgen of which 13928 was irrigated in 1937.66 But, as predicted earlier,
not everybody participated in the expansion and growing prosperity. W.J Fouche,
for example, reduced the area under cultivation on his farm from 41 to 34 morgen
in 1937.66 White settlers on the Ohrigstad Settlement, who had been reduced to
42 settlers by 1933, were still mostly concerned with survival and were not
involved in any substantial expansion of production.67 Settlers on the Spekboom
Irrigation Scheme also struggled for survival. Their position in 1938 was described
in the following terms: 'As a result of crop-failure the position of the settlers at the
Spekboom Scheme is awful. Very little has changed during this year.*68
Numerous bywoners also complained of poverty, and of their inability to make a
living on the small plots and shares that they were allocated. A large percentage
of those who registered with the State's Assistance Scheme had worked on the
roads and the railways; temporarily, as a means to get by while they searched for
farm land that they could rent.69 Although the evidence on their future plans is
thin, it nevertheless suggests that, while many bywoners desperately clung to a
rural lifestyle, others were desperate to leave the land. For example, W.C. Meyer
lived in the house of farm-owner Johan Steyn, and helped with the farm work. He
had tried to leave Lydenburg to get a job elsewhere, but the train that he was on
failed to stop at the place of his new work. In desperation he jumped from the
moving train, and was badly injured. Back in Lydenburg Johan Steyn described
him as having no belongings, disheartened and depressed. Steyn was helping him
'to get away from this place'.70
This picture of poverty and lack of progress amongst significant portions of
Lydenburg's white fanning population is given further weight by the reports of the
Standard Bank inspector, who pointed to the existence of a large number of
farmers who made very little headway in the 1930s.71 He also described
Lydenburg's farmers as *of the backward type', 'satisfied with conditions that
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suited their forefathers', working on farm properties that were 'small and heavily
bonded'.72
However, a look at Lydenburg*s leading farmers completely contradicts the Bank
Inspector's assessment, confirming the highly differentiated character of the
fanning community in the 1930s. These farmers were dynamic, risk taking
entrepreneurs, who poured capital into their farms in order to build dams, bridges,
sheds, and even a privately owned electric light plant.73 What these progressive
farmers had in common was access to capital outside of agriculture. The four
leading farmers in Lydenburg during the 1930s were a Member of Parliament,74
a teacher,75 a trader,78 and a miller.77 These jobs allowed the farmers to vent
their forward-looking ideals without risking their survival on the land.
The majority of farmers, on the other hand, were not prepared to raise their
production costs and risk the possibility of experiencing a bad year during which
they would be unable to meet these costs.78 Land Bank loans were a source of
capital - for those who owned enough land for security - but usually only for long
term loans.79 The interest rates on these loans were lower than at other banks,
but there was probably a stronger obligation on farmers to pay the instalments on
these loans in the 1930s, than, say, in the 1960s.80 Land Bank loans also further
discouraged a steady investment in agriculture as the instalments often
encompassed a large proportion of a farmer's disposable income.81 Tampering
with secure profit margins therefore meant entering the risk of losing one's land,
as failure to pay an instalment might lead to foreclosure on mortgages. Credit
societies that issued short term loans were first noted in 1930, but appear to have
had little effect on the fact that most farmers were *badly off financially* in
1936.82 Short terms loans became more readily available after 1938, when the
Land Bank became directly involved, but it was the increase in loans to
Cooperatives that substantially affected farmers' access to working capital, and
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83this only became significant in the 1940s.
Even when small farmers got access to capital they were loath to tamper with
secure profit margins, because raising of production costs made farmers more
vulnerable to losing their land.84 The attachment to land as a way of avoiding
'the city' - noted as important during the nineteenth century - remained an
important factor in the 1930s.86 In 1934, the choice for most Lydenburgers was
between being an 'independent farmer' or an unskilled labourer.86 There were
processes already under-way - based to a large extent on the kind of thinking
outlined by De Souza above - that tried to expand the urban opportunities
available to white South Africans. But, during the 1930s, when the 'problems of
rural education' still loomed large, access to land remained a secure alternative
compared to the risks of finding employment in an urban centre like
Johannesburg.87
The emergence of over-production in both maize and wheat production during the
1930s suggests that many farmers were determined to stay on the land in-spite
of hostile market forces. It is true that the new agricultural control boards blunted
these market forces, but only to a limited extent as many farmers at the time felt
that the prices set by the boards were not high enough to guarantee a satisfactory
profit.88 High railway rates were, for example, a source of complaint, and played
an important role in a district as far away from the markets as Lydenburg.89 A.
Op t' Hof, furthermore, disputed that the Marketing Boards operated exclusively
in favour of the farmer and disregarded the consumer.90 He explained:
The farmer never has made much out of the production of wheat. The production
cost of good wheat is round about £1 per bag of 2001b; so I fail to see that the
farmer who grows even 500 to 1000 bags of wheat can grow fat; he barely ekes out
83
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a living when he can sell all his wheat at 22s.*1
Op t* Hof had an interest in justifying the board's prices, but his argument fits
with the complaints made against the Maize board. Farmers often maintained that
the 'small but progressive farmer* could not survive on the fixed prices, and the
only farmers to prosper were the large Orange Free State producers, 'rich in land
and capital', who had 'the main say in the Association'.92 These complaints must
be read in conjunction with OMeara's assessment of the Marketing Act. He argues
that the Board's stabilised prices and profits mainly led to larger farms and an
expansion of land under cultivation.93 Taken together, the evidence indicates that
large farmers with available land could make profits by substantially expanding
their production, but small farmers continued to struggle. Those farmers in
Lydenburg who, like R.J. Schurink above, already had the capital and land to
invest in the construction of new canals, could expand their wheat fields under
irrigation. But the poor farmers, settlers and bywoners of Lydenburg, who were
often restricted to less than ten morgen of irrigated land and reportedly produced
an annual profit of only £50, did not benefit greatly from the boards established
in the 1930s. In the words of Op t' Hof these farmers Tbarely eked out a living1.94
A comparison between the farms Skaapkraal and Rietfontein shows the extent of
the differences in Lydenburg farm sizes during 1938. The former was 1227 morgen
in total, of which 140 was irrigated. The farm was also 'fully fenced and divided
into camps'.96 The latter contained 29 morgen of irrigated land and 40 morgen
of arable land in total. The farm was 'mostly fenced in'.96 In 1930 the average
size of farms in Lydenburg was 620 morgen.97 By 1937 the average size declined
to 606 morgen, but one must assume that not all the farms in Lydenburg became
smaller.98 Unfortunately more detailed figures for Lydenburg are not available,
but the figures for the Transvaal as a whole clearly indicate that both the number
of very large farms and the number of very small farms increased significantly
during the 1930s. The farms between 2000 and 5000 morgen increased from 1506
in 1930 to 1577 in 1939, while the farms between 1 and 100 morgen increased
from 6711 in 1930 to 7758." These figures point to growing economic divisions
amongst white farmers, and these processes were still evident in Lydenburg
during the 1950s, when regional figures are available.
The expansion of production amongst the leading farmers in Lydenburg caused the
demand for labour to become more intense during the 1930s. In conjunction with
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many other farmers throughout South Africa, the farmers of Lydenburg called on
the state to intervene to overcome agriculture's 'crippling labour shortage*.100
1940-1948
Two important trends - agricultural diversification and mechanisation - became
prominent during the 1940s. These developments had been apparent earlier, but
it was only in the 1940s that they became widespread. As early as 1928 some
farmers had gone in for tobacco, but they remained a small minority, increasing
slightly in 1939.101 The substantial expansion in production occurred during and
after World War Two; the area planted with tobacco in 1946 was more than two
and a half times the size of the area planted in 1939.102 Further, because the
war led to shortages in many basic foodstuffs, a number of Lydenburg farmers
began to produce vegetables in 1943.103 In that year farmers in the district
reaped one of the largest wheat crops in its history.104 But the drought during
the following two years caused a decline in output, and after that the farmers in
Lydenburg produced less and less wheat as more farmers diversified into tobacco,
vegetables and citrus fruit.105 It was reported that the latter product was
gradually becoming established in some areas in 1949, although a number of
problems remained:
'According to E.F. Mai an, of the Research Station, Nel spruit, the standard of citrus
[at Marone and Waterval Valley] was outstanding. The Valley offered unlimited
possibilities for citrus farming, if sufficient water could be supplied. Because frost
does occur in the Valley, farmers should limit themselves, as far as the commercial
market is concerned, to citrus culture only, and should not endeavour to produce
all the different specie of tropical fruit.'106
Concentration on wheat production was also undermined by the emergence of the
Orange Free State as an important dry-land wheat producing area.107 The wheat
produced in this area was cheaper because it did not involve irrigation. This had
a negative effect on the trend in wheat prices, and Lydenburg*s expensive
production methods thus became uneconomical.108 The production of wheat in
Lydenburg*s valleys was condemned anyway by agricultural officers who favoured
a mixed fanning system. To strengthen their case these officers referred to the
Spekboom River, where - like in many of Lydenburg's other valleys - farmers
double-cropped with wheat and maize:
'It must be realised that the present system of farming in which wheat plays the
100
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major role is completely wrong. A mixed farming system involving summer crops,
cattle, pigs and chickens seem to be a better alternative. ... It is apparent that
during the past few years the farmers have not once achieved a decent crop. Last
summer the maize crop failed as a result of too much rain and the winter weather
brought an untimely cold-spell that caused great damage to the very promising
wheat crop.'109
A few Spekboom farmers recognised the problem and made the transition to
diversification in 1939 by planting soya-beans and by taking up pig farming. Thus
wheat fanning was becoming less important during the 1940s, even though Op t'
Hof claimed in 1946 that Lydenburg was still essentially a wheat farming district,
and the majority of Spekboom farmers still farmed with wheat and maize in the
1950s.110 Wool, on the other hand, remained an important product, especially as
wool prices climbed steadily during the 1940s.111
As a result of these processes the district's agricultural character changed during
the 1940s, and began to fit with the description offered by Johan Steyn, the
manager of the Lydenburg Cooperative from 1937 to 1952:
This district is unique because it lies in three climatic regions. The [Waterval
Valley] is in the bushveld. [South-east of Lydenburg town] going through to
Machadadorp is more middle-veld. Going south you have highveld again. Now that
influences the type of product that people produce. In the bushveld and the
lowveld, that is fairly sub-tropical, and all production there takes place under
irrigation. Water comes from the highveld in rivers and they take it out in canals
and dams. Their production will be sub-tropical fruits, citrus, paw-paws, avocados,
and then they produce wheat and tobacco. In the middle-veld you find more maize
farming, beans, sugar beans, soya beans, and cattle farming. Out to the highveld,
Dullstroom, Belfast that way, that is very good sheep farming, wool sheep, and
mixed farming: Sheep and cattle/"2
Lydenburg reported a serious labour shortage in 1943, and then again in 1945
when the situation was reportedly worse.113 This was part of an ongoing national
situation, and farmers from all over the country filled the pages of the Farmers
Weekly with complaints about such a shortage. Some farmers, and a few liberal
observers like Margaret Ballinger and Leo Marquard, believed that the solution
lay in offering better treatment and conditions.114 But the majority were of the
opinion that African workers could not appreciate better conditions, and that
109
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higher pay would only cause Africans to work less.116 Most of these farmers
called on the state to force Africans into farm labour, but a number of others also
saw mechanisation as a solution.116 Included amongst the latter group were
agricultural officers, one of whom argued in 1944:
'Labour is today, in some respects, a problem. But it is rapidly disappearing. The
wheat crop today does not offer any difficulty at the time of harvesting since the
introduction of the combine. ... Essential labour can be retained with the ample
use of machinery. With machinery one can reduce labour by 25 to 30 per cent.'117
The reasons given by farmers for mechanisation often centred around the notion
that it enabled them to do the work themselves.118 Mrs Baragwanath, the wife
of a Lydenburg farmer, explained that they mechanised so that they did not have
to depend on unreliable African labour:
'Unless you are with them all the time, they don't reap the mealies and they steal
the mealies. At the farmer up the road, they would sit down and have beer the
minute he left. And people felt it was just becoming uneconomical to employ
[Africans]. So really they worked themselves out of jobs. They just have no
motivation.'119
Mrs Kloppers, the wife of a Lydenburg farmer and the grand-daughter of Dirk
Winterbach, who was one of the original white settlers in Lydenburg, explained
that her husband preferred to drive the tractor himself:
'My husband and my son have always driven the tractor. My husband now and
then used a black to help with the driving, but we have never had a permanent
tractor driver. We have got three big tractors, but we have no blacks to drive the
tractors.'•120
Tractors are not necessarily labour replacing, and in South Africa as a whole
machines only replaced farm labour in the 1970s when combine harvesters were
used on maize farms.121 However, if the use of tractors is to cause an increase
in labour, it must be accompanied by an extension of the area under cultivation.
In Lydenburg the size of the irrigated fields was limited by the amount of water
available, and even where an extension was possible it would require an additional
investment in a canal or dam. The statistics show that during the period 1939 to
1950 the number of tractors increased from 46 to 233, while the land under
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agricultural crops increased from 25576 in 1937 to 27945 in 1947.123 This is a
fairly significant increase, and probably also reflects the growing use of fertilisers,
which, according to Mr. Baragwanath, made the ploughing of dry land a much
more viable option.123 But if the expansion in land-use is divided by the number
of tractors, the increase comes to a fairly modest 12.6 morgen per tractor. It is
therefore highly likely that some farmers used their tractors to expand their
production, while others used them to replace labour. This assumption is borne out
further by the discrepancy in farm sizes at the time. During the period 1946 to
1952, of the Lydenburg farms put up for sale, most were fairly small (there were
hardly any bigger than 1000 morgen). Most contained an average of 20 to 30
morgen of irrigated land, but there were also many differences. Some farms were
only 10 or 49 morgen in total size, while others extended to 780 or 1500 morgen.
More importantly some farms contained no dry-land at all, and only 14 or 17
morgen of irrigated land, with no possibility of extending this area. Others had
great potential for the extension of irrigated and dry-land, including one farm that
contained as much as 250 morgen of arable land.124 Clearly this kind of farm
would allow the use of tractors to create a greater demand for labour, while on the
smaller farms the adoption of tractors would generally be labour replacing, which
fits with the experiences of labour tenants, most of whom remember tractors as
a machine that lessened their work-load.126
The question that remains is why smaller farmers, who had been opposed to
improving their farms in the 1930s, were now ready to invest in tractors. The
answer lies in the extension of credit to the Cooperative. The Cooperative, as
explained above, was formed in 1910, but it was dissolved during the depression.
Prior to its collapse it had been relatively successful.126 During 1915 and 1916
it handled between 70 and 75 per cent of the produce in Lydenburg, which was
high for the time.127 But after it was revived as the Voorspoed Cooperative Ltd
in 1936 it attracted many more members, which was in keeping with the growing
tendency towards organised agriculture in South Africa as a whole. A Transvaal
Agricultural Union report for 1939 gave the following synopsis of the situation:
'Much progress has been made lately in Lydenburg regarding the cooperation of
various organisations and affiliations with the district union. I ascribe this to the
application of the Marketing Act and schemes thereunder. Fortunately the
antipathy towards the TAU has disappeared and we hope for wholehearted
cooperation.'128
The Marketing Act, by making controlled marketing attractive, made it almost
impossible to avoid cooperation. The other factor in this process was that 'all
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requirements - implements, tractors, fuel, fertiliser, packaging, fodder, veterinary
medicines and so forth' were now supplied by the cooperative to its members.129
This was facilitated by the massive extension of credit to cooperatives during the
1930s and 1940s. In 1929 the Lydenburg Cooperative received a loan of £14500.
In 1930 the size of this loan increased significantly, and, although figures for
individual cooperatives are no longer available for the following period, it is
reasonable to assume that this trend continued as Land Bank loans to
cooperatives increased from £1820901 in 1929 to £3011624 in 1939 to £7123352
in 1945.130 Thus it became possible for the Cooperative to supply farmers with
equipment at very reasonable and drawn out instalment rates. As Johan Steyn
explained:
They [Lydenburg's farmers] have over-capitalised because it is made attractive to
them. They get easy credit, they are induced to buy by the Cooperative salesman.
The salesman is given a free trip over-seas if he sells the most tractors and he does
not care if the farmer can pay or not.'131
Apart from the increasing availability of Land Bank loans, direct state aid also
expanded in the 1940s. Aid to white farmers began, in the twentieth century, with
the Repatriation Boards after the Boer War, and then took the form of cattle loan
schemes, assistance with stock diseases and locusts, and poor white settlements
in Ohrigstad, Spekboom and Steelpoort. During the period 1928 to 1931, for
example, a total of 61250 anthrax vaccines were issued to farmers in
Lydenburg.132 During the period 1947 to 1949, 349 applications under the 1935
Farmers Assistance Act were received.133 In 1939, when Lydenburg suffered a
'disastrous flood', it was, according to the Lydenburg News, 'only natural to expect
the farmers in our district to turn to the one and only source whence aid might be
expected, namely the Government'.134 These expectations were duly fulfilled as
'the Government* provided farmers with both funds to reconstruct their washed
away water-canals, and with free maize to feed themselves and their
labourers.135
With the passing of the Soil Conservation Act in 1946 state aid entered a new era.
Under this act, districts would, with the approval of resident farmers, be declared
as 'soil conservation regions' and would then be eligible for assistance and
subsidies in the interest of conserving the soil.136 The regions of Lydenburg were
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declared in terms of this Act in 1948,137 and many farmers began to reap the
benefits in the 1950s. But, as is shown below, conflict emerged over this state aid
as some farmers wanted to use it to extend their farming activities while others
hoped to guarantee their survival on the land without increasing their risks.
The increases in state aid and credit allowed more farmers than before to benefit
from agriculture, although, in keeping with national trends, it was undoubtedly
the larger 'progressive* farmers that made the biggest contributions to expansions
in output.138
1949-1960
The 1940s were marked by the food shortages of World War Two, the continuing
expansion of agricultural markets and the growing prominence of tractors on
white farms. But agriculture was to be promoted even further in the 1950s. In
1948 a political shift occurred that significantly affected this development. The
election of the National Party during that year marked the beginning of a new era
that manifested itself in the 1950s. O*Meara argued that farmers felt that the
United Party did not provide them with high enough agricultural prices, and they
therefore voted for the National Party.139
The National Party subsequently delivered on its promise to increase state support
of white agriculture, and significantly advanced capital accumulation in the white
rural areas. This argument was supported by Lazar who claimed that from 1949
the government raised prices in order to 'encourage production*. He pointed out
that during the next three years the average price per bag [of maize] was 'raised
from 21s.3d to 30s. For many farmers this meant almost the doubling of net
profits and they responded almost immediately to the incentive. Production
increased rapidly and, after that time, there were surpluses every year.'140 The
1950s were therefore a period during which more farmers could make a profitable
living from agriculture, although many still found it difficult to make ends meet
and, as shown below, either left the rural areas or struggled hard to keep their
land.
A further indication of the state's new, unambiguous support for white agriculture
can be found in the massive increase in the loans given to cooperatives, from
£7123352 in 1945 to £27869488 in 1950, to £65132878 in 1955.141 Consequently
machines and implements from the cooperative were even more readily available
in the 1950s than they had been in the 1940s, which fits with the assessment of
a Lydenburg resident who said: 'after the National Party came to power you could
drive your old tractor into the cooperative and drive out with a brand new one
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without a cent changing hands.'142 During the period 1950 to 1959 the number
of tractors in Lydenburg increased from 233 to 599. An even more telling figure
is the number of ploughs pulled by tractors. In 1955 there were 1214 animal
drawn ploughs in the district and only 273 that were pulled by tractors. In 1960
there were still 801 of the former, but also 729 of the latter.143 Threshing
machines, which had been the earliest form of mechanisation in the district,
gradually diminished during this period. Wheat farmers began to replace them
with combine harvesters. There were 20 combines in the district in 1956, and
although the number declined to 13 in 1960, these harvesters were mainly owned
by syndicates, and hired out during the harvesting season.144
These inputs produced significant changes in the agricultural economy of
Lydenburg during the 1950s. In 1953 the Magistrate explained that 'this district
in the process of developing. During the past few years many large properties have
been sub-divided, and more intensive farming methods are being practised.145
Further, a more detailed assessment drawn up in 1958 makes it apparent that
agricultural diversification had increased, and that many farmers had prospered
during the relatively good years since World War Two. On the other hand there
were many farmers that had not prospered and struggled to cling to their land.
Successful farmers had benefitted from the construction of dams by the state, the
introduction of winter-feed for sheep, and the good prices for wool, wheat and
tobacco.146 Those farmers who struggled occupied farms that were too small to
allow for the extension of acreage under crops. They continued to double with
wheat and maize on exhausted soil, and many could only retain their land by
undertaking migrant labour contracts on the railways, road-works and mines.147
Despite frequent references to labour shortages, the available labour supply had
increased dramatically in the 1950s, and the evidence suggests that the problem
had become less acute by 1958.148 There were, however, regional variations in
the supply of labour, which suggests that the kind of conditions that different
farmers offered continued to play a crucial role. Furthermore, there is additional
evidence to support the picture of massive stratification and changing farm sizes
that emerges from the above description.
In 1950 the average farm size in Lydenburg was 605 morgen. In 1955 it was 667.
This shows that subdivision had been a strong trend during the 1940s, and that
the process was beginning to reverse in the 1950s as some, mainly small, farmers
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struggled with the expense of mechanisation and decided rather to look for
employment in the booming industrial sector.149 The diminishing number of
small farmers, and the growth in the average farm size also suggests that more
farmers could now take full advantage of the opportunities offered by
mechanisation, which helps to explain why a minor labour shortage continued to
exist despite massive increases in the number of farm workers.
The other important change that had gradually occurred was the decline in the
number of absentee farmers. In 1937 69 per cent of the farmers owned the farm
on which they lived. By 1950 this had increased to 77 per cent. In 1937 14 per
cent of the farms were occupied on a shares basis or managed for the owner. In
1950 this declined to 9 per cent, and in 1955 to 8 per cent. By 1960 the farmers
of Lydenburg were putting 19352 morgen under irrigation. In addition 1809
morgen were under 'permanent crops' and 1063 morgen consisted of artificial
pasture. In total 45325 morgen were under agricultural crops. This represents a
massive increase of the 27945 morgen under agricultural crops in 1947, and once
again explains why some farmers still complained of a labour shortage in the
1950s.
However, as was evident from the detailed picture of Lydenburg presented above,
many small farmers continued to cling to the land. In Lydenburg during 1950,175
farms were smaller than 100 morgen; in 1954 there were 194; and in 1957 there
were 151. A statistic that is even more telling is that in 1958, 362 farms yielded
a profit of less than £300 per annum, while only 389 yielded more than £300. In
1959 417 farms yielded more than £300, and a still significant 270 yielded less. In
1958 Lydenburg*s farmers owed £628530 to the Cooperative, the Land Bank and
other commercial banks.150
Thus many farmers marginalised by this economic progress refused to give up
their farms; rather becoming migrant workers in order to keep land that did not
provide them with their basic requirements. These farmers viewed state aid in a
particular way: as an aid in their struggle to remain on the land. They were
therefore weary of any aid that could make their profit margins even more risky,
and as a result they often clashed with farmers who hoped to expand their
production with the state's assistance. These processes emerge from an application
for a dam in terms of the Soil Conservation Act, by 44 farmers in the Spekboom
Valley. The farmers who applied for the dam wanted to expand their farming
enterprises by placing more land under irrigation. But the farmers who countered
the petition, and appealed to the state to refrain from building the dam, explained
that this development would necessitate an increase in levies. Thus, although
farming in the area as a whole would probably benefit from the dam, the increased
costs would make it difficult for those particular farmers to continue farming.151
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The same conflict occurred in the Steelpoort Valley in 1952, and again in 1954,
when it was about fencing.152 Numerous other examples also emerge from
farming districts all over the country.153 A few are cited here in order to present
a fuller picture of the values that motivated many white farmers. In 1954 in the
Western Transvaal, for example, farmers were facing the loss of their entire crop
as a result of commando-worms. They claimed that they could not invest in the
equipment and chemicals necessary to avoid this disaster, because they were
'already very deeply in debt'. They asked the government to save them.154
Farmers all over the country, in fact, expected the state to protect them from the
economic and ecological forces that threatened to separate them from their
land.156 Probably the clearest and most extreme expression of the line of
thinking that expected the state to sustain white farmers on the land irrespective
of their efficiency came from a fanner who called himself'a friend' of the National
Party. He argued:
There is only one solution. The production of maize must be controlled. To do that,
every farmer must only be allowed to produce a certain number of mealies at a
certain price. ... Where would you find a better plan. The problem with you rich
Ministers is that you only look after the rich man, and don't care a damn about us
less fortunate people.'156
This evidence proves that while state aid enabled more and more farmers - like
those in the Steelpoort and Spekboom Valleys who supported the construction of
dams - to invest in agriculture and attempt to maximise their profits, there was
a significant group who saw the state as a resource in their survival on the land.
They used funds earmarked for fighting locusts to send their children to school,
and to transport products to the market; they were sometimes squeezed off the
land by more efficient producers, but they also continued to struggle against these
processes.157 A look forward at the farm sizes in Lydenburg during 1963
indicates the trends, as well as the persistence of small farms. The number of
farmers declined to 638 and the average farm size grew to 798 morgen. There
were still 114 farms that were smaller than 100 morgen, but farms between 100
and 1000 morgen constituted a significant majority. Only one farm remained
'undivided', while 14 farms were larger than 2000 morgen. Thus, although many
inefficient farmers had been pushed out of the district, farm sizes still varied
enormously.
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CONCLUSION
Houghton argued that 'few meaningful generalisations' can be made about South
Africa agriculture, because of the huge variety in farm size and efficiency; an
observation that is largely true for the district of Lydenburg.168 One broad
generalisation about the district can, however, be made. All the farmers relied on
state assistance in order to either survive on the land, or to expand their
productive capacity. As mentioned in the beginning of the Chapter, Lydenburg
remained a backward district within the Transvaal. The farmers of Lydenburg
were therefore at a competitive disadvantage, which pushed them into seeking
state assistance, and into relying on cheap labour forms. Within this broad
consensus, the farmers of Lydenburg were affected by economic progress in three
different ways: Some used the new economic opportunities to expand their
production, others struggled to remain on the land and refused to take risks with
their profit margins, and a third group, which became more numerous in the
1950s, decided that the city offered a better standard of living and left the
land.169
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